of Native Americans into and from the 'unassigned lands' that became Oklahoma?
Within the musical world of Oklahoma, it is no thought at all. Ultimately, the beautiful American morning the show celebrates requires setting some others beyond the pale.
Although Oklahoma may not be accurate as history, its exclusions, the stories it does not or cannot tell, nonetheless testify to the failures of liberal tolerance to make room for wider forms of social difference. Making social space for difference does not mean that everyone has to be friends. Indeed, the widening I will argue for in this essay both requires and produces an agonistic public square. This is democracy as discomfort. However, democracy does not require that we agree with each other, let alone like each other. As recent events in the real--life Oklahoma suggest, agonistic democratic pluralism is an unfinished project.
-'SAVE OUR STATE'
In November 2010, voters in the state of Oklahoma overwhelmingly approved a ballot measure that bans judges from 'considering or using Shariah Law' when making a ruling. State Question 755-also known as SQ 755, the Shariah Amendment, the Oklahoma International Law Amendment and, most apocalyptically, the 'Save Our State' Amendment-garnered the support of 70 per cent of voters. In addition to amending the state constitution to ban judicial consideration of Shariah law, the measure also more broadly forbids courts from 'considering or using international law'. This coupling of Shariah law and international law requires some preliminary explanation and conceptual untangling. The section of SQ 755 that forbids a state court from 'considering or using international law' reflects a broader conservative distrust of any citation of international law as amounting to a violation of American sovereignty. This hostility is seen even among some jurists themselves. For example, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has been a very public critic of reference to foreign law in US courts. One notable case in point is his withering dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, the 2003 Supreme Court case that found laws against consensual 'homosexual sodomy' to be unconstitutional. The vote in that landmark case was six to three. Justice Scalia voted in the minority to uphold anti--sodomy statutes. His dissent was wide--ranging, but he was particularly exercised by the majority This hostility to international law is hardly some quirk of Justice Scalia, but can be seen also in the US Congress's unwillingness to ratify any number of international treaties. Moreover, such opposition cuts across simplistic partisan political distinctions and extends a long tradition of American exceptionalism, whose shadow gives cover to nativist suspicions of 'foreigners'. A state amendment to ban a court's consideration of foreign laws could probably survive constitutional scrutiny and be upheld by the courts. It is the singling out of a specific religion-Islam-that poses constitutional issues, as I will shortly argue. In fact, two other US states, Tennessee and Louisiana, both passed more neutrally worded 'anti--foreign law' bills in 2010, which made no reference to any religion, precisely in order to avoid this legal problem. Legalisms aside, we should not lose sight of the ugly challenge to democratic values posed by these carefully worded bans on foreign law. The contemporary organised movement to pass such bans is in fact the 'polite' face of what is, at its foundation, an anti--Muslim campaign. 3 Whether or not a law passes constitutional muster does not tell us the whole story. Thus, even as I do address the constitutional dilemmas posed by anti--Shariah laws below, the larger concern of this essay is on the extra--legal effects of such bans, how they simultaneously illuminate and animate anti--Muslim bias as well as reveal broader problems raised by the US discourse of tolerance. The First Amendment begins: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof'. Religious freedom has two components: disestablishment and free exercise, and a lot of ink has been spilled over the relation between these two aspects of religious freedom: how they are related, whether one is more important than the other and how to balance their principles when they seem to conflict. These are not just academic questions. In Love the Sin: Sexual Regulation and the Limits of Religious Freedom, Janet Jakobsen and I argue that it matters a great deal for the practice of democratic social relations whether one sees these two principles as separable or interstructuring. 4 Public political debates over the meaning of religious freedom in the United States all too often produce the following balkanisation: proponents of more religion (really, more Christianity) in US public life and in government lean heavily on the free exercise component and underplay disestablishment. Conversely, many secularists-not all secularists, to be sure, but many-stress the absolute separation of church and state and minimise free exercise. In contrast, Jakobsen and I see disestablishment as the structuring condition for free exercise. Otherwise, those who are religiously different or not religious at all may well find their lives not simply less admired and valued than those who belong to the dominant religion; they may find they have diminished legal status.
Jakobsen and I are sympathetic to those who are nervous about an over--presence of religion in American public life; however, we do not think the problem is religion per se, with the banishment of religion from public life as the only remedy.
Rather, the problem is one of social dominance. 5 Currently, the religion that enjoys the most room for 'free exercise' in the United States is Christianity. Christianity A butcher would no longer be able to enforce his contract for halal meatcontracts that, like deals for kosher or other faith--sanctioned foods, are regularly enforced around the country. Nor could a Muslim banker seek damages for violations of a financial instrument certified as 'Sharia compliant' since it pays no interest. 13 This burden on free exercise thus violates the second component of First Amendment religious freedom. To its credit, the Oklahoma district court did not pull its punches in identifying the anti--Muslim bias animating the amendment: the
'amendment is not facially neutral, discriminates against a specific religious belief, and prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons'. 14 
-THE FRAME OF DIFFERENCE: INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS TO THE NATION
Most legal analysts agree that the district court's injunction will likely become permanent and will survive appeal. The anti--Shariah amendment is dead, for now, in the state of Oklahoma. More than legal prohibitions are at stake, however. The dense network of ties spun by Duncan-nation = Judeo-Christian = familyproduces powerful affective resonances across ideological and creedal affiliations. 18 The addition of 'Judeo' is important here, as it further cements the notion that State Question 755 is not religiously discriminatory. First, the hyphenate 'Judeo--Christian' posits a false identity and equality between Judaism and Christianity. 19 Second, in the specific context of public debates over the place of Muslims in American life, 'Judeo--Christian' effectively triangulates two groups of religious outsidersAmerican Jews and American Muslims-identifying the former as manifesting an acceptable form of religious difference, and setting the latter outside the boundaries of national belonging.
As Jakobsen and I argue in Love the Sin, such acts of naming are part of the process by which the lines between who belongs and who does not are drawn and reinforced. 20 Public discourse, how we talk about and frame debates over difference, matters; it materialises. Indeed, how we talk about and name 'others' can turn social difference, which is not or need not be a problem, into social division, which is. This is not a recent dilemma, and tolerance is not the solution. Robust democratic engagement that widens the space for difference, rather than requiring those who are different to become more of the same, is.
-WHAT THE CENTRE CANNOT HOLD

In The Citizen Machine: Governing by Television in 1950s America, Anna McCarthy
analyses the emergence of television as a technology of national belonging, tracing how corporations, non--profit foundations, intellectuals, and politicians variously sought to use the new medium to teach citizens how to properly engage in democratic life in the United States during the Cold War. 21 One of the things McCarthy illuminates is how a centrist language of balance and moderation was deployed by both conservatives and liberals to discredit opposing positions as 'extremist' and over the line. Of course, not every individual or group was equally positioned to have its appeals to centrism credited. In practice, the language of the centre was also a vocabulary of marginalisation that secured the boundaries of the general public by relegating some subjects to its outside. concern here is with the way such appeals actually function in the storm of public debates over the boundaries of US public life. This is a rather different 'storm' from the one Duncan worries over. Reasonableness or rationality can also work hand in hand with its ostensible opposite: a mobilisation of public feelings.
-PUBLIC FEELINGS AND THE RHETORIC OF REASONABLENESS
Consider in this regard the intensely mediatised political tempest over Cordoba House, the proposed Islamic centre in downtown Manhattan. This project has become (un)popularly known as the 'Ground Zero Mosque'-an act of misnaming that stuck and has powered much of the controversy over the proposed building.
The language of reasonableness may sound softer and kinder than the blatant Islamaphobia of many of the project's opponents, but it amounts to much the same thing: narrowing the social space available to be and 'do' difference in public. For those on the margins of US national belonging, the receiving end of such tolerance may not feel so good.
In the controversy over the 'Ground Zero Mosque', Muslim Americans are not being formally excluded by a democratic majority, as they were by Oklahoma voters.
Rather, they are being asked (albeit not so politely) to subordinate their free exercise rights under the First Amendment to the hurt feelings of the rest of America; they are also being called upon to identify with the dominant centre-to feel its pain as their own. This set of substitutions assumes that Muslim--Americans are not already part of the United States and also reveals just how limited are the boundaries of moderation, fairness, and tolerance.
The frame of tolerance-the way it legitimates some actors and their public feelings even as it delegitimates some others-can also help make sense of the morally stupefying equivalence some political pundits and media outlets in the United States made between evangelical Pastor Terry Jones's announced 'International Burn a Koran Day', which was timed to coincide with the ninth anniversary of 9/11, and the planned Cordoba Center. Both came to be represented as actions that were within the First Amendment rights of the groups proposing them but which would be 'hurtful'. As with Eisenhower's refusal to meet with civil rights leaders more than sixty years ago, once again we see how inadequate 'moderating' notions like fair and balanced are to making crucial moral distinctions and creating more democratic social space for being different and 'doing' difference.
In the song with which I began this essay, the hero of Oklahoma proclaims his 'beautiful feelin' that everything's goin' my way'. Democracy, however, is not only about beautiful feelings and having things your way. This is among the reasons we need courts to protect the rights of unpopular minorities from the sentiments of majority rules. However, law is not the only forum, and certainly not the most common one, for democratic engagement with difference. In everyday life, we bump up against each other and may well be discomforted by differences we cannot assimilate or will not understand. But difference is not a problem or 'the' problem to get over. It is rather the very material of our lives with others, and the democratic worlds we may yet make. Bronski.
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